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341 
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: A RETURN TO THE RULE 
OF LAW 
Wendy K. Mariner,* George J. Annas** & Wendy E. Parmet*** 
“As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice 
between our safety and our ideals.”  Inauguration Address of 
President Barack Obama, January 20, 2009. 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
On January 15, 2009, US Airways flight 1549 apparently 
struck a flock of birds shortly after taking off from New York’s 
LaGuardia airport and lost power in both of its engines.2  The 
pilot, Chesley Sullenberger, made a skillful emergency landing 
in the Hudson River, and all 150 passengers and five crew 
members safely evacuated the plane.3  The passengers calmly 
helped each other out onto the wings and into the plane’s life 
rafts.  Local ferries, seeing the plane coming down, sped to the 
site and took the passengers on board.4  What might have been 
a fatal disaster in the eighteen degree Fahrenheit temperature 
was in fact a fairly typical example of Americans’ response to 
emergencies. 
Historically, Americans have reacted to emergencies with 
remarkable common sense, demonstrating that one can be 
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1. Aspects of this article are based on GEORGE J. ANNAS, WENDY K. MARINER & WENDY E. 
PARMET, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH−NOT A LAW 
ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY−APPROACH, American Civil Liberties Union (Jan. 2008), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/33642pub20080114.html. 
2. Robert D. McFadden, All 155 Aboard Safe as Crippled Jet Crash-Lands in Hudson, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A1. 
3. Id. 
4. Michael Wilson & Al Baker, In Icy Water, a Quick Rescue Kept Death Toll at Zero, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A1. 
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frightened and rational at the same time.5  Although reporters 
asked whether the survivors were “terrified” or “panicked,” 
the passengers interviewed insisted that everyone remained 
calm and just got the job done.6  Several factors undoubtedly 
helped turn the potentially fatal emergency into a story of sur-
vival.  The passengers cooperated with each other.  As noted 
by the University of Pittsburgh’s respected Center for Biosecu-
rity, “members of the public are first responders and outbreak 
managers, too.”7  Here, the “first responders” were the plane’s 
crew, its passengers, and nearby civilians such as commercial 
ferry operators and fishermen.  Official emergency crews from 
New York’s police and fire departments and the Coast Guard 
arrived a bit later. 
Another key factor was that everyone involved had tools for 
survival at their disposal.  The plane was equipped with life 
vests and rafts.8  Crews of both the plane and ferry operators 
were trained in rescue operations, having practiced as a rou-
tine part of their work.  Captain Sullenberger demonstrated 
quick thinking.  Air traffic controllers offered runways at Tee-
terboro and Newark airports, but Sullenberger realized there 
was not enough time to fly over a thickly settled urban area 
and instead brought the plane down in the river.9  That he 
managed to land the plane afloat was probably a combination 
of his extraordinary skill, clear weather, and the river’s relative 
calm.  Had the weather been stormy, the plane could easily 
have tipped under the water. 10 
 
5. Ben Sheppard et al., Terrorism and Dispelling the Myth of a Panic Prone Public, 27 J. PUB. 
HEALTH POL’Y 246, 247-49 (2006). 
6. Eric Moskowitz & Maria Cramer, Golf Trip Friends from Mass. Among Plane Crash Survi-
vors, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2009, at A6; Michael Wilson & Russ Buettner, After Splash, 
Nerves, Heroics and Even Comedy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A1. 
7. WORKING GROUP ON CMTY. ENGAGEMENT IN HEALTH EMERGENCY PLANNING, CTR. FOR 
BIOSECURITY, MAJOR FINDINGS, 1 (2007), available at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/web 
site/focus/community_engage/2007_working_group/findings.html 
8. McFadden, supra note 2, at A24. 
9. Susan Carey, US Air Pilots Thought of New York, New Jersey Airports Before Ditching in 
River, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123384802390852577.html. 
10. See, e.g., AMIT PATEL & RICHARD P. GREENWOOD, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. 
DOT/FAA/AR-95/54, TRANSPORT WATER IMPACT AND DITCHING PERFORMANCE 5 (1996), 
available at http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar95-54.pdf.  For current data on 
airline emergency landings and ditching, see Aviation Safety Network, Aviation Safety Data-
base, http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Event=REED&lang=&page=1 (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2009). 
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Surviving US Airways flight 1549 depended on trusting 
one’s fellow human beings and the kind of readiness that 
comes from everyday experience, access to necessary re-
sources, and common sense.  Current discussions of emer-
gency preparedness would do well to heed its lessons.  This 
Article examines what past emergencies can teach us about 
preventing and controlling epidemics of infectious disease.  It 
begins in Part II with a brief summary of the types of resources 
necessary for minimizing the damage from epidemics—what 
has recently become known as “preparedness.”  Chief among 
these is a healthy population, which is resilient and able to re-
sist infection or respond well if it arrives.11  Thus, effective 
emergency preparedness depends heavily on sustainable sys-
tems of medical care and public health working together. 
Since September 11, 2001, emergency preparedness policies 
have shifted their focus from public health to national security, 
bioterrorism, and personal responsibility.  Part III of this Arti-
cle argues that this shift is both contradictory and ineffective.  
Part IV then critiques proposals for law reform that increase 
personal responsibility for health, while reducing official ac-
countability.  Such proposals can distort the rule of law in 
general, while doing little, if anything, to prevent public health 
emergencies.  Laws governing bioterrorism cannot be limited 
to emergencies because responding to bioterrorism is essen-
tially the same as responding to naturally occurring epidem-
ics; the same law necessarily governs all public health emer-
gencies.12  The Article concludes that effective emergency pre-
paredness depends on prevention and the availability of 
appropriate resources and planning, not on laws specially de-
signed for emergencies. 
 
11. N. Howard-Jones, Origins of International Health Work, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1032, 1034 (1950) 
(“[Q]uarantine barrier methods are of very limited value and . . . resistance of a community to 
infection is dependent upon its internal conditions.”). 
12. Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH 
L. 247, 283 (2005).  See generally OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006). 
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II. REAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
An epidemic—and especially a pandemic—can wreak 
havoc.  Yet, unlike nuclear weapons or exploding airplanes, 
epidemics are not recent innovations in human history.13  Both 
medical and public health professionals, as well as the general 
public, understand the fundamentals of what should be done 
to minimize the spread of disease.14  In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, government organized programs that 
purified the water supply to prevent the spread of cholera, 
built sewage systems to remove sources of disease, and pas-
teurized milk to make the food supply safer.15  Quarantines 
prevented ships arriving from epidemic countries from 
unloading infected cargo.  Health departments distributed 
vaccines as they became available.  Individuals avoided con-
tact with people who were contagious, and those who fell ill 
usually sought help from physicians.  States created licensure 
boards to ensure at least a minimum quality of competence for 
hospitals, physicians, and other health providers.  This period 
also saw the rise of movements for women’s suffrage, birth 
control, and abolition of child labor.16  Later, Congress estab-
lished regulatory agencies to approve food, drugs, and cos-
metics, reduce environmental pollution, make the workplace 
safer, and reduce the hazards of consumer products.17  These 
 
13. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST 
PLAGUE IN HISTORY (2004); HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892 (1997); JIM MURPHY, AN AMERICAN 
PLAGUE: THE TRUE AND TERRIFYING STORY OF THE YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC OF 1793 (2003);  
CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS (1962). 
14. See generally DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, ARE WE READY?−PUBLIC HEALTH 
SINCE 9/11 (2006). 
15. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LAW (2009); JOHN DUFFY, 
THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH 89-91 (1990); THOMAS MCKEOWN, 
MEDICINE IN MODERN SOCIETY: MEDICAL PLANNING BASED ON EVALUATION OF MEDICAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 51 (1965); Elizabeth Fee, The Origins and Development of Public Health in the 
United States, in 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 35-54 (Roger Detels et al., eds., 3d. ed. 
1997). 
16. See generally JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2003). 
17. See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE 
WORKING ENVIRONMENT, 91-98 (Island Press, 1996); see also Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2004) (establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission); 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2004); Occupational and Health 
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efforts required organized, collective action, and they brought 
many infectious diseases under control, improving the health 
of the general population.  Between 1900 and 2005, life expec-
tancy increased from forty-seven to seventy-eight years.18 
Today, most public health experts recognize that a healthy 
population depends upon safe environments, a safe food sup-
ply, and access to medical care to treat illness and injury.  Pub-
lic health programs make it possible for people to avoid dis-
ease and stay healthy.  These efforts are rarely glamorous.  
They often require a sustained effort over time, with dedicated 
personnel working quietly out of the limelight.  They also en-
tail working with communities, giving them the information 
and resources they need to help themselves and their 
neighbors.  Community engagement is both a watchword and 
the most effective way to create a population that is resilient 
enough to resist disease and care for its members.19  Moreover, 
a healthy population that is prepared to resist disease may be 
a deterrent to biological attack.20 
In the past, many epidemics of contagious diseases, such as 
influenza and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
were introduced into the country by travelers from overseas, 
who typically were unaware of their illness.  Preventing a se-
rious pandemic, therefore, requires cooperation with other 
 
Safety Administration Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2004) (estab-
lishing the Occupational Health and Safety Administration); Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 
Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Dec. 2, 1970) (establishing the Environmental Protection Agency). 
18. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008, at 203 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf#026; see BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC 
HEALTH: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 39 (4th ed. 2007).  See generally VICTOR FUCHS, WHO 
SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE (World Scientific Publ’g Co. 2002) 
(1998) (arguing that genetic, environmental, and behavioral factors had more influence on 
health than medical care); GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (The John Hopkins 
Univ. Press 1993) (1958).  But see David M. Cutler, Declining Disability Among the Elderly, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 11, 18 (2001) (arguing that physicians and medical researchers played a greater 
role in increasing life expectancy than is generally acknowledged). 
19. Monica Schoch-Spana, Community Resilience for Catastrophic Health Events, 6 
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE,  & SCIENCE 129, 129-30 (2008).  
For an extensive collection of references on community engagement and vulnerable popula-
tions in disasters, see Univ. of Md. Ctr. for Health and Homeland Security, Vulnerable Popu-
lations: Emergency Preparedness Conference, http://www.umaryland.edu/healthsecurity/ 
mtf_conference/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
20. COMM’N ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND 
TERRORISM, WORLD AT RISK: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 111 (2008), available at 
http://www.preventwmd.gov/report/. 
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countries and international organizations to develop the kind 
of local environments abroad that reduce the possibility of 
disease.  After the SARS epidemic in 2003, the World Health 
Organization tried to improve its system for alerting countries 
to the presence of a new or serious contagious disease.21  As a 
practical matter, however, its new rules are likely to depend 
on voluntary compliance and may not prevent the spread of 
disease significantly.  Moreover, given the speed and volume 
of global travel and commerce, it is probably impossible to 
shut out a highly contagious disease such as influenza.  Strate-
gies that rely on closing borders are doomed to fail. 
Once introduced into a country, the harm from a contagious 
disease with epidemic potential can nevertheless be limited.  
The medical measures to be taken depend upon the character-
istics of the specific virus or pathogen itself: whether it can be 
transmitted through the air or by casual contact; whether 
transmission of infection occurs before or after symptoms ap-
pear; whether diagnostic tests exist to identify the disease; and 
whether there is a vaccine to prevent infection or medicine to 
cure it or reduce its damage.  A country with adequate capac-
ity for research on infectious diseases has the singular advan-
tage of answering these critical questions in time to make the 
right decisions about how to protect its population.  Thus, 
emergency preparedness includes supporting a research en-
terprise directed at preventing and treating infectious diseases, 
including emerging diseases, such as possible strains of avian 
influenza.  The development of vaccines to prevent infection 
may curtail the impact of future diseases, just as vaccines have 
eradicated once-feared diseases like small pox and polio, and 
may reduce the cases and severity of others, like measles and 
mumps.  At the same time, the country needs a reliable drug 
approval process that functions in the public interest to ensure 
that the drugs and vaccines developed are safe and effective.  
This means improving the capacity of the Food and Drug 
Administration to operate independently and expeditiously. 
To assure an adequate supply of safe and effective vaccines, 
medicines, and life-saving medical equipment during an epi-
demic, it may be necessary for government to create stock-
piles.  The move to “just in time” inventories may have im-
 
21. See generally World Health Org., Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA 
58.3 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/. 
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proved the efficiency of private sector distributors and retail-
ers, but the limited supplies are insufficient in times of emer-
gency. 
Most people who get sick go to a hospital, clinic, or physi-
cian’s office.  In an emergency, it will be important for people 
to have a trusted source of medical care available.  This sug-
gests that a key component of emergency preparedness is ac-
cess to regular medical care, whether in the form of direct ser-
vice delivery or through health insurance coverage.  A popula-
tion that is already plugged into the medical system, and 
presumably already attending to its own health needs, is well 
positioned to act responsibly in a crisis.22  There is ample rec-
ognition that people who lack health insurance coverage are at 
greater risk of illness, disability, and death than the general 
population.23  Equally important are the social costs of unin-
surance, which leave individuals in precarious circumstances 
unable to participate fully in society.24  Without ready access to 
medical care, the uninsured are less likely to have an infec-
tious disease diagnosed and treated to avoid spreading it to 
others.  The lack of universal health insurance also creates 
strains on hospitals that receive a large influx of patients with-
out the means to pay for their care.  Thus, expanding access to 
health care to the entire population contributes substantially to 
preparing for emergencies.  It is the socioeconomic equivalent 
of vaccination against disease.25 
Of course, hospitals and clinics need to be available to those 
in need.26  In an emergency, they need not only clean water, 
safe food, medicines, and equipment, but also a reliable power 
supply as well as staff trained for surge capacity and continu-
 
22. See generally INST. OF MED., SHARED DESTINY: COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF UNINSURANCE 
(2003). 
23. See generally INST. OF MED., COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001). 
24. See generally INST. OF MED., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 
(2003); Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics—Preserving our Hospital Infrastructure During and After a 
Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 106-07 (2007). 
25. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism & the People: How to Vaccinate a 
City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 217 (2002). 
26. This discussion does not address the federal National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS), which fields trained teams of medical personnel to provide short-term emergency 
care in disasters. For an assessment of the NDMS, see generally DISASTER MED. WORKING 
GROUP NDMS ASSESSMENT PANEL, STRATEGIC IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL DISASTER 
MEDICAL SYSTEM (NDMS) (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/conferences/ 
nbsb/ndms-rpt-0809.pdf. 
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ity of operations.27  In medical facilities, good infection control 
practices can make the difference between containing and 
launching an epidemic.  In Toronto, the SARS epidemic was 
halted after hospitals initiated rigorous infection control pro-
cedures, including requiring all staff to wear protective gear 
and treating infected patients in isolation from others.28  These 
practices also hold value for everyday medicine, especially 
since nosocomial infections like Methicillin resistant Staphylo-
coccous aureus (MRSA) have been increasing dangerously in 
recent years.29  Making infection control a routine operation, 
like routine training in water rescues for ferry crews, enables 
medical providers to respond quickly and effectively to poten-
tially dangerous novel infections. 
When no vaccine or treatment is available, the best way to 
prevent disease from spreading is to keep people away from 
sources of infection.  This can include limiting or cancelling 
events with large crowds and even temporarily closing schools 
and businesses.30  People are generally quite willing, when 
they are able, to shelter in place by staying at home.31  How-
ever, they may not be able to do so without support.32  People 
who cannot afford to lose the income they earn from work 
should not be forced to choose between their livelihood and 
their health or the health of others.  If government officials 
 
27. See Crystal Franco et al., Systemic Collapse: Medical Care in the Aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, 4 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 135, 136 (2006) 
(describing New Orleans hospitals without power, because generators were in the flooded 
basement). 
28. Tomislav Svoboda et al., Public Health Measures to Control the Spread of the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome in Toronto, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2352, 2353-54 (2004). 
29. See generally R. Monina Klevens et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus Infections in the United States, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1763 (2007). 
30. See generally BARRY, supra note 13 (describing examples of social distancing).  Evidence 
on the effectiveness of school closings in reducing the spread of influenza is mixed.  Benjamin 
J. Cowling et al., Effects of School Closures, 2008 Winter Influenza Season, Hong Kong, 14 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1660, 1660-61 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/EID/ 
content/14/10/pdfs/1660.pdf; World Health Org. Writing Group, Nonpharmaceutical Public 
Health Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, National and Community Measures, 12 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88-89 (2006). 
31. Robert J. Blendon et al., Attitudes Toward the Use of Quarantine in a Public Health Emer-
gency in Four Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. W15, W21 (2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/2/w15. 
32. See Clete DiGiovannni et al., Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine in Toronto 
During the 2003 SARS Outbreak, 2 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, 
PRAC., & SCI. 265, 267-70 (2004) (discussing the need to help quarantined individuals with 
their incomes, supplies, and physical care). 
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recommend that people stay home, then government should 
be prepared to provide the necessary financial support to 
make it possible, either directly, or by requiring employers to 
keep at least low-wage workers on staff and pay them for shel-
ter days. 33  There should also be adequate provision for the 
necessities of safe food, water, and medicine for those who 
stay at home, at least beyond a day or two.  Most drug benefit 
plans limit the quantity of prescription drugs patients can ob-
tain to a thirty or sixty day supply.  Such plans should be al-
tered to allow patients to stockpile a month’s supply in case of 
emergency. 
Beyond necessaries, both officials and the general public 
should be able to communicate with others, ideally via reliable 
cell phones and computers.  This is crucially important regard-
less of the reason for being separated, whether it is hospitaliza-
tion, flooding, or simply staying at home.  Overloaded and in-
compatible electronic equipment make communications im-
possible and can frustrate logistics of all kinds.34  Although 
variety and choice are as American as apple pie, interoperable 
means of communicating and adequate backup sources of en-
ergy, from batteries to generators to satellites, are essential in 
an emergency.35 
To be effective, all these measures must be developed in 
consultation with, and understood and accepted by, the pub-
lic.36  The information that is provided should be culturally 
 
33. During the SARS epidemic, governments in Canada found it necessary to provide in-
come support for those who stayed home because of the disease.  See Nola M. Ries, Public 
Health Law and Ethics:  Lessons from SARS and Quarantine, 13 HEALTH L. REV. 3, 4 (2004) ("A 
SARS Assistance Program was also established to offer some financial compensation to people 
who lost income during periods of quarantine.”). 
34. HURRICANE KATRINA – A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. Rep. No. 109-322, at 287-297 
(2006) (Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrinana-
tion.html. 
35. Donny Jackson, Survivable Communications: Much More Than Hardened Radios, URGENT 
COMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 1, 2005, http://urgentcomm.com/mag/radio_survivable_commu-
nications_hardened/. 
36. See generally ROZ D. LASKER ET AL., WITH THE PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE, WE CAN MAKE 
SHELTERING IN PLACE POSSIBLE (2007) (discussing how to educate the community and involve 
them in emergency preparedness, so that they can effectively shelter within their own towns), 
available at http://www.redefiningreadiness.net/pdf/sipreport.pdf; Monica Schoch-Spana et 
al., Community Engagement: Leadership Tool for Catastrophic Health Events, 5 BIOSECURITY AND 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 8 (2007) (discussing the need for commu-
nity engagement during crisis). 
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sensitive and available in the different languages that are spo-
ken in a particular community.  Mechanisms should be in 
place to explain what is known, what remains unknown or 
uncertain, and what the public can do to protect themselves 
and their families.37  This includes not only the nature of the 
likely risks, but also the resources that will be made available 
to those in need and how to access them.  During a pandemic, 
travel presents a special challenge.  Governments should warn 
travelers about real risks through travel advisories and alerts 
and take measures to reduce the spread of disease by travel. 
Even more important, the source of information should be 
an entity or person that the public can trust. 38  Many Ameri-
cans are no longer willing to rely on official sources of infor-
mation, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  Most people’s first priority during an emergency is 
the safety of their loved ones.  As a New York Academy of 
Medicine study reported, when asked about their willingness 
to remain in an officially imposed quarantine location, a ma-
jority of individuals said they would go find their families 
unless they received trustworthy information about their fam-
ily’s safety and could communicate with them.39  The study 
also found that only forty-three percent of those surveyed 
would obey official recommendations to go to a vaccination 
site during a smallpox outbreak; more than half of those ex-
pressed concern about the vaccine’s safety.40  They preferred to 
talk to a trusted physician unaffiliated with the government.41  
Trust can be developed by involving the community in identi-
fying needed resources, planning response procedures, select-
ing reliable people for the tasks at hand, and generally creat-
ing relevant and useful approaches to improve public health.42 
Finally, government officials involved in epidemic control 
programs should remain accountable for their actions.  It is 
difficult to place one’s faith in official pronouncements and ac-
 
37. This should include undocumented persons, who are often ignored in formal planning 
processes. 
38. George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
1171, 1178-79, 1181 (2003). 
39. ROZ D. LASKER, REDEFINING READINESS: TERRORISM PLANNING THROUGH THE EYES OF 
THE PUBLIC 31-33 (2004), available at http://www.nyam.org/library/docs/sipreport.pdf. 
40. Id. at 8-9. 
41. Id. 
42. See generally Schoch-Spana et al., supra note 36. 
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tions if those in charge are not held responsible for abuses of 
authority or even gross negligence.  Proposals to grant offi-
cials, emergency workers, volunteers, and pharmaceutical 
makers immunity from liability are counterproductive.  Not 
only does it leave the victims of a disaster worse off, but it sig-
nificantly undermines public trust in the public health re-
sponse system. 
These measures require money more than law.  To be sure, 
effective pandemic planning will require some legal changes.  
For example, the jurisdictional boundaries among federal and 
state agencies raise legal issues that could benefit from clarifi-
cation.43  Several measures, such as allowing patients to stock-
pile prescription drugs, might require specific legislation on 
prescription quantities and insurance coverage.  To the extent 
that infection control practices are not universally required of 
medical facilities, licensure regulations may need amending.  
The most comprehensive legal change would be legislation 
providing for universal access to health care or health insur-
ance coverage. 
For the most part, however, the laws required to prepare for 
emergencies are laws authorizing the expenditure of funds to 
support measures like expanding health insurance, providing 
necessaries, keeping hospitals and clinics open, training medi-
cal staff, conducting research, stockpiling medications, and 
providing information to the public.  Few of these measures 
differ in quality from those needed to protect the health of the 
public in the absence of emergencies.  And that is precisely the 
point.  Emergency preparedness requires a well-functioning 
public health system.  A healthy, well-informed population 
can survive the challenge of disease with the same common 
sense used by the passengers on US Airways flight 1549. 
III. UNREAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
When President Bush declared a Global War on Terror after 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, he intensified a new para-
digm in public health policy.  Although explosives were and 
 
43. Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent the 
Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 107, 108 
(2006) (describing some confusion over federal authority to respond to natural disasters with-
out state consent). 
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remain the weapon of choice for those who seek to terrorize 
Western countries,44 many in the administration began to 
worry about the possibility that bioweapons also could be 
used.45  The “Dark Winter” simulation46 may have convinced 
Vice President Cheney that the country was defenseless 
against bioterrorism, spurring him to recommend that every-
one in the country be immunized against small pox,47 contrary 
to the advice of medical experts, including the administra-
tion’s top expert on smallpox, Dr. D.H. Henderson.48  In The 
Bush Tragedy, Jacob Weisberg describes President Bush’s fear 
that a second wave of terrorist attacks would follow 9/11 and 
that the anthrax incidents could be that wave.49  Later, fears of 
bioterrorism were central to the Administration’s justification 
for the invasion of Iraq.50  For an administration prone to 
imagining catastrophe,51 it was a short step to considering 
 
44. Mark Wheelis & Masaaki Sugishima, Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons, in DEADLY 
CULTURES – BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SINCE 1945, at 284, 284-85, 301-302 (Mark Wheelis et al. eds., 
2006). 
45. See David P. Fidler, Caught Between Paradise and Power: Public Health, Pathogenic Threats, 
and the Axis of Illness, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 45, 84 (2004) (arguing that international diplomacy 
has vacillated between deeming epidemics as a threat to national power and an opportunity 
for global cooperation). 
46. See generally Tara O’Toole, Michael Mair & Thomas V. Inglesby, Shining Light on “Dark 
Winter,” 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 972 (2002) (describing the design, execution and re-
sults of the “Dark Winter” program, a governmental exercise in preparation for a possible 
bioterroristic attack). 
47. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 343-344 (2008). 
48. See COMM. ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION BD. ON HEALTH 
PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, REVIEW OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION’S SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, LETTER REPORT #4, at 18-
19 (2003) (“In the absence of any current benefit to individual vaccinees and the remote pros-
pect of benefit in the future (as such benefit would be realized only in the event of a smallpox 
outbreak, and the outbreak occurred in the vaccinee’s region), the balance of benefit to the in-
dividual and risk to others (through contact with the vaccinee or through disruption of other 
public health initiatives) becomes unfavorable.”), available at http://books.nap.edu/open-
book.php?record_id=10788&page=R1; JACOB WEISBERG, THE BUSH TRAGEDY 189-90 (2008). 
49. WEISBERG, supra note 48, at 189-90; see also LEONARD A. COLE, THE ANTHRAX LETTERS 
137, 144, 240 (2003) (discussing the Bush Administration’s belief that biological weapons are 
potentially the most dangerous weapons in the world, and the Administration’s  increased 
concern over an Iraqi biological weapons arsenal). 
50. E.g., Judith Miller, Threats and Responses:  Germ Weapons; CIA Hunts Iraq Tie to Soviet 
Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 3, 2002, at A4 (discussing the Bush Administration's concern over 
potential Iraqi possession of smallpox as communicated by a Soviet informant). 
51. See generally RONALD SUSKIND, THE ONE-PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S 
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 (2006) (describing the idea that a one percent risk should 
be responded to as though it were a certainty and detailing the differing levels of the federal 
government’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks). 
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natural epidemics of contagious diseases as a threat to national 
security.52 
The so-called preemption doctrine advanced by the Bush 
administration leached into policies governing pandemic pre-
paredness.53  The idea that the federal government should use 
force to prevent enemies from developing weapons to attack 
the United States found parallels in public health programs.54  
Converting the well-known risk of epidemics into the equiva-
lent of war on the American people enabled the federal gov-
ernment to exert a degree of control over individual patients 
that was unprecedented in the modern era, and to spend fed-
eral dollars to encourage states to do the same.55  Surveillance 
of Americans’ health conditions, from tuberculosis to cancer 
and diabetes, expanded in a manner similar to the National 
Security Agency’s surveillance to identify terrorists.56  Federal 
 
52. George J. Annas, The Statue of Security: Human Rights and Post-9/11 Epidemics, 38 J. 
HEALTH L. 319, 320-21 (2005); see JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND 
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 72, 189 (2007) (claiming that Bush’s presidency 
will be defined by his constant fear of a devastating attack); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., A 
SAFER FUTURE: GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (2007) (describing 
pandemic flu as “the most feared security threat” in the world), available at 
http://www.who.int/whr/2007/whr07_en.pdf.  See generally IN THE WAKE OF TERROR: 
MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 2003) (addressing the 
threat of bioterrorism and the spread of disease).  One reason why epidemics raise such a fear-
ful specter today is that they have become such rare events in the western industrialized 
world, largely because of past successes in eradicating diseases like small pox and keeping 
other diseases, like measles, to a minimum with childhood vaccinations; see Aaron Wildavsky 
& Karl Drake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?, 119 DAEDALUS 41 (1990) 
(describing factors influencing risk perception). 
53. WHITE HOUSE, NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 6-7 (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 
policy/national/nss-020920.pdf (“This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For ex-
ample, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but 
with all hazards.  Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but 
all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop ter-
rorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.”); WHITE HOUSE, NAT’L SEC. 
COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12-13, 23-24 
(2006), available at http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/docs/nss2006.pdf  (“The place of pre-
emption in our national security strategy remains the same.”). 
54. See, e.g., David Brown, Military’s Role in Flu Pandemic: Troops Might Be Used to “Effect a 
Quarantine,” Bush Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A05 (noting that President Bush sug-
gested a mass quarantine, carried out through military intervention, in the event of an influ-
enza epidemic). 
55. Crystal Franco, Billions for Biodefense, Federal Agency Biodefense Spending, FY 2008-2009, 6 
BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 131, 131 (2008). See gen-
erally Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006) 
(codified in scattered sections of 6, 38, 42 U.S.C.). 
56. Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. 
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agencies advocated expanding state and federal powers of in-
voluntary detention to include people who simply may have 
visited a place where the disease might be found.57  Paradoxi-
cally, however, conceptualizing epidemics as national security 
threats did not translate into federal provision of assistance to 
those most at risk of illness, as our history and sound public 
health policy counsel.  The Administration’s preference for 
market-based health care left individuals to fend for them-
selves.58 
The signature catch-phrase of this approach was that we 
must “trade liberty for security.”59  This misguided maxim, 
carried over from the war on terror, equated those who were 
sick with the nation’s enemies and failed to heed history’s les-
sons.  Too often, government officials have used the fear of 
epidemics to abuse their power.  For example, when bubonic 
plague appeared in San Francisco in 1900, the Surgeon General 
ordered people of Chinese ancestry to be vaccinated with the 
risky and unpopular Haffkine vaccine that could cause severe 
side effects. 60  A federal court found the vaccination order un-
 
L. REV. 347, 349-350 (2007); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see also ROBERT O’HARROW JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 8 
(2005) (“[G]overnment's ability to examine our lives is only going to increase in coming 
years.”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE 
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128, 128-130 (Richard C. 
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). 
57. New federal regulations were proposed in 2005, but have not been adopted to date.  
Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 70 & 71), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/.  Public 
comments were largely critical of the proposed changes.  See generally JENNIFER B. NUZZO ET 
AL., COMMENTS FROM THE CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY OF UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL 
CENTER ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 42 CFR 70 AND 71 (QUARANTINE RULES) (2006) (expressing 
general criticism of the proposed changes to the CFR), available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/ nprm/comments/2006Jan28_UPMC.pdf; NEW ENGLAND COAL. 
FOR LAW & PUB. HEALTH, COMMENTS ON THE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN QUARANTINE 
REGULATIONS PROPOSED BY THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,  DEPT. OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, 42 C.F.R. PARTS 70 AND 
71,  PROPOSED RULEMAKING , RIN 0920-AA03 (2006) (critiquing the proposed regulations’ 
omission of constitutional protections and likelihood that they would not aid the public 
health), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/comments/2006Feb3_NECLPH. 
pdf. 
58. Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails to Prepare Us for a Pandemic, 2 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 157, 179-83 (2006). 
59. David Luban, Eight Fallacies About Liberty and Security, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE “WAR 
ON TERROR” 242, 242 (Richard Ashley Wilson ed., 2005); David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Secu-
rity: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT’L J. LEGIS. INFO. 290, 291 (2003). 
60. MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN 
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constitutional.61  In response, the San Francisco board of health 
ordered San Francisco’s Chinese quarter quarantined.  This, 
too, was held unconstitutional.62  The federal appeals court 
found it to be “unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive,”63 in-
fringing on the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; confining everyone, whether 
healthy or sick, together irrationally facilitated the spread of 
infection instead of containing it.  The ordinance also violated 
the Equal Protection Clause, because the quarantine unjusti-
fiably confined only residents of the “Chinese race.”64  The 
quarantine fence that sealed off the area serpentined around 
the homes and businesses of Caucasians, leaving them free to 
come and go as they pleased.65  The court rejected health offi-
cials’ argument that that the Chinese were particularly suscep-
tible to plague and concluded that the ordinance was the 
product of “an evil eye and an unequal hand.”66 
Marilyn Chase recounts the postscript to the quarantine fi-
asco in her history of San Francisco’s recurrent battle against 
plague.67  A new federal health officer, Rupert Blue, aban-
doned imperious mandates and began to work with the com-
munity, explaining how fleas on rats and rodents carried 
plague and engaging residents to clean up their neighborhood.  
His painstaking efforts took time, but they did end the epi-
demic.68 
Experience with smallpox follows a similar pattern.  In 1894, 
Milwaukee tried to stop a smallpox epidemic by forcing im-
migrants and indigent residents into a quarantine hospital.  
The “patients” reacted with mistrust and rioting.69  Not long 
thereafter, the Boston health department sought to halt a re-
currence of the disease by requiring vaccination against small 
pox.  Despite a policy that forbade actually forcing the vaccine 
 
FRANCISCO 48, 61 (2003). 
61. Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 9-10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1900). 
62. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 24 (C.C.D. Cal. 1900). 
63. Id. at 26. 
64. Id. at 14. 
65. Id. at 23; CHASE, supra note 60, at 18. 
66. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 24 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)). 
67. CHASE, supra note 60, at 48. 
68. Id. at 125-195. 
69. Judith Walzer Leavitt, Public Resistance or Cooperation: A Tale of Smallpox in Two Cities, 1 
BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: DEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 185, 186-88 (2003). 
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on anyone, health officials, accompanied by police, set about 
forcibly vaccinating African-Americans and residents living in 
the poorer parts of the city.70  These actions may have fueled 
the anti-vaccination movement in the state. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, coercive methods of 
controlling disease seemed a distant memory.  When small 
pox appeared in New York in 1947, the city organized a sub-
stantial public education campaign to explain the risks of in-
fection and the benefits of vaccination.71  Assured that officials 
wanted to protect, not persecute, them, thousands of people 
lined up to receive the vaccine in a massive voluntary immu-
nization program offered by the city.72  The program was a 
success, and small pox soon disappeared from New York.73 
More recently, the SARS epidemic demonstrated the value 
of providing the public with accurate information and using 
modern infection control techniques in hospitals.74  In Toronto, 
Canada, SARS was primarily a nosocomial disease that also 
spread to patients’ household contacts.75  The government in-
voked Ontario’s Emergency Management Act, which gave it 
authority to regulate local governments and facilities to ensure 
that essential services were provided—a form of surge capac-
ity.76  Hospitals temporarily suspended elective and outpatient 
services, created isolation wards for SARS patients, required 
all staff to use protective gloves, gowns, eyewear and respira-
tors when seeing patients, and screened all staff, patients, and 
visitors for SARS symptoms.77  Once these measures were put 
 
70. Workmen Vaccinated, BOSTON HERALD, March 16, 1902, at 10; Wendy E. Parmet et al., 
Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health--100 Years After Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 652, 653 (2005). 
71. Leavitt, supra note 69, at 185-86. 
72. Id. at 189-90. 
73. Id. at 181-91. 
74. See generally Robert A. Weinstein, Planning for Epidemics—The Lessons of SARS, 350 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 2332 (2004). 
75. Monali Varia et al., Investigation of a Nosocomial Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada, 169 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 285, 285 (2003); see also, e.g., Svoboda 
et al., supra note 28, at 2352, 2359. 
76. See Svoboda et. al., supra note 28, at 2353. 
77. See INST. FOR BIOETHICS, HEALTH POL’Y & LAW, UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE SCH. OF MED., 
QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS (2003), http://www2a.cdc.gov/ 
phlp/docs/Quarantine-Isolation-Lessons-Learned-from-SARS.pdf (discussing how Asian 
countries like Singapore, Vietnam, and China responded similarly to Toronto in taking drastic 
measures to contain the spread of SARS in hospitals).  Income support was also provided to 
those who stayed at home.  See supra note 33. 
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in place, the infections stopped spreading.78  The United States 
had far fewer suspected and confirmed cases of, and no deaths 
from, SARS.79  With advice from public health officials to 
avoid public settings where the disease could be transmitted—
social distancing—people were able to prevent exposure.  
Most people who might have been already exposed tended to 
stay at home.80  Although these responses were often de-
scribed as “quarantine,” they almost never relied on any court 
or administrative order.81  Of little value, however, were at-
tempts to use thermal screening—taking the temperature of 
people suspected of fever—to identify cases, especially at air-
ports,82 despite public support for the measure.83 
These examples, typical of the country’s experience with 
epidemics, teach two lessons.  First, the public’s health is best 
protected when government treats people like clients rather 
than enemies of public health.84  People do not want to get 
sick, and they do not want to make other people sick.  Given 
accurate information and the means to protect themselves 
from disease, almost everyone will take appropriate precau-
tions.  To be sure, there will always be a few who are unable or 
unwilling to control their behavior, but these are the excep-
tions to the rule.  Successful public policies cannot be based on 
the exception.  Moreover, current laws authorizing the invol-
untary confinement of those who have a contagious disease 
 
78. Svoboda, supra note 28, at 2359-70; Varia et al., supra note 75, at 291. 
79. World Health Org., Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 Novem-
ber 2002 to 31 July 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/in-
dex.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); Ctr. for Disease Control, Revised U.S. Surveillance Case 
Definitions for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Update on SARS Cases – United 
Stated and Worldwide, December 2003, 52 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1202, 1203 
(2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5249.pdf; Annas, supra note 52, 
at 334. 
80. George J. Annas, Blinded by Terrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 
HEALTH MATRIX 33, 65 (2003). 
81. Reports of quarantines in the literature do not uniformly distinguish between volun-
tary self-isolation and court-ordered involuntary confinement, and some use the term “quar-
antine” to mean any separation from others. See, e.g., David M. Bell & World Health Organiza-
tion Working Group, Public Health Intervention and SARS Spread, 2003, 10 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1900, 1901 (2004); M.L. Lee et al., Use of Quarantine to Prevent Transmission 
of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Taiwan, 2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680, 
680-683 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5229.pdf. 
82. X. Pang et al., Evaluation of Control Measures Implemented in the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Outbreak in Beijing, 2003, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3215, 3219-20 (2003). 
83. Blendon et al., supra note 31, at W18. 
84. Annas, supra note 80, at 64-65. 
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and are likely to spread it to others (typically persons with a 
mental illness or substance abuse disorder who cannot appre-
ciate the need for precautions or control their behavior) are 
sufficient to protect the public from infection.85  Mandating 
confinement and vaccinations by fiat is more likely to engen-
der mistrust than cooperation.  Highhanded orders too often 
lead people to avoid public health programs.86  In April 2003, 
residents of a rural Chinese town ransacked a school building 
that was being converted into a quarantine facility for urban 
SARS patients or those at risk for SARS.87  Almost a quarter of 
a million people fled Beijing when the government announced 
a mandatory quarantine to prevent the spread of SARS.88  By 
dispersing throughout the country, they may have exacer-
bated the epidemic.  Moreover, studies indicate that quaran-
tines of geographic areas have almost never halted an epi-
demic.89  At best, they might delay the worst for a short time.90  
In the meantime, even voluntary quarantine can cause stress 
and impose significant economic costs.91 
The second lesson is that coercive measures invite abuse and 
exacerbate social divisions.  Measures like quarantine, surveil-
lance, and behavior control have historically been targeted at 
people who are already disadvantaged, those on the margins 
of society, especially immigrants, the poor, and people of 
 
85. See infra Part 4. However, as discussed infra, the discriminatory impact of such meas-
ures can be problematic. 
86. Many African Americans remain skeptical of government health advice, see Blendon et 
al., supra note 31, at W22, in part, perhaps, because of the government’s handling of the Tus-
kegee experiment.  See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 220-
41 (1981). 
87. Erik Eckholm, The SARS Epidemic: Fear; SARS Is the Spark for a Riot in China, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2003, at A1. 
88. Annas, supra note 80, at 65; C. Hutzler, China Reverts to Top-Down Rule with Heavy Hand 
to Fight SARS, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at A8; Joseph Kahn, Quarantine Set in Beijing Areas to 
Fight SARS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A1. 
89. Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United 
States, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2711, 2715-16 (2001).  See generally Howard-Jones, supra note 11. 
90. Bell, supra note 81, at 1900-01. 
91. See Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public’s Reaction to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in 
Toronto and the United States, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 925, 925 (2004) (studying psy-
chological and economic effects of SARS outbreak); L. Hawryluck et al., SARS Control and Psy-
chological Effects of Quarantine, Toronto, Canada, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1206, 1206 
(2004).  See generally, Jong-Wha Lee & Warwick J. McKibben, Estimating the Global Economic 
Costs of SARS, in LEARNING FROM SARS 92 (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the 
economic effects of global SARS outbreaks), available at http://www.nap.edu/cata-
log.php?record_id= 10915. 
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color.92  As Priscilla Wald details in Contagious, an analysis of 
popular literature and movies, public officials often character-
ized people with contagious diseases as threats to society.93  In 
their view, the best way to counter the threat was to give sci-
ence control, not simply to discover the source of infection or 
develop vaccines, but to monitor and manage people, requir-
ing them to obey strict regimens of isolation or treatment.  
Wald calls this the “outbreak narrative,”94 arguing that offi-
cials often interpreted the facts to fit their theory of risk and 
response.95  Not surprisingly, the people who were most often 
believed to need controlling were those who deviated from 
prevailing social norms.96  Even well-respected physicians and 
public health leaders held the view that the “lower classes” 
spread disease because they practiced poor hygiene.97  To 
these opinions might be added the widely-held suspicion that 
people of color and the poor in general were prone to laziness, 
violence, intoxication, and sexual deviancy, which could only 
be kept in check by official intervention.98  Although we may 
believe ourselves more enlightened now—and today’s public 
health practitioners are indeed sensitive to cultural differ-
ences—the targets of most disease prevention programs are 
typically the same groups that were blamed for epidemics in 
the past.  For example, at least ninety percent of those sub-
jected to involuntary commitment for tuberculosis (TB) in 
New York in the 1990s were people of color.99  Thus, it will be 
 
92. See generally ALAN M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GERMS, GENES, AND THE “IMMIGRANT 
MENACE” (1994); BARRON H. LERNER, CONTAGION AND CONFINEMENT: CONTROLLING 
TUBERCULOSIS ALONG THE SKID ROAD (1998); Alice Fothergill & Lori A. Peek, Poverty and Dis-
asters in the United States: A Review of Recent Sociological Findings, 32 NAT. HAZARDS 89 (2004); 
Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS, and the Curtailment of Individual Liberty 
in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85 (2003). 
93. PRISCILLA WALD, CONTAGIOUS – CULTURES, CARRIERS, AND THE OUTBREAK NARRATIVE 
(2008). 
94. Id. at 2. 
95. See generally id. 
96. Id. at 82-113. 
97. See generally id.; JOHN ETTLING, THE GERM OF LAZINESS (1981); JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, 
TYPHOID MARY: CAPTIVE TO THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH (1996); C.-E.A. WINSLOW, THE LIFE OF 
HERMANN M. BIGGS, M.D., D.SC., LL.D. PHYSICIAN AND STATESMAN OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
(1929); Kraut, supra note 92. 
98. See generally JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2003). 
99. See generally M. Rose Gasner et al., The Use of Legal Action in New York City to Ensure 
Treatment of Tuberculosis, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 359 (1999) (a study of involuntary commit-
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important to take care that government measures intended to 
protect the public health do not fall prey to unrecognized 
prejudices. 
Together, these lessons argue for policies governing emer-
gency preparedness in which government assumes a societal 
responsibility for enabling people to stay healthy and make 
sensible decisions about protecting themselves from harm.  
This entails providing the public with accurate information 
about risks, providing materials and services that are not effi-
ciently made available privately, ensuring that everyone has 
access to health care, earning the public’s trust and confidence 
by acting transparently, respecting the Constitution and the 
rule of law, and ensuring accountability for its actions. 
These lessons have been largely ignored since 9/11.  Instead, 
the federal government has emphasized the personal respon-
sibility of individual Americans, reinforcing the age-old as-
sumption that those who become sick must have done some-
thing to deserve their illness.100  Federal agencies wrote nu-
merous emergency preparedness plans and checklists.101  Most 
contain noble sentiments and some sensible provisions.  In re-
ality, however, they offered little of the assistance necessary to 
respond to an epidemic or other disaster,102 as most poignantly 
seen in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina.103  The Ad-
 
ments in New York from 1993-1995). 
100. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt noted that 
“Communities that fail to prepare, expecting the federal government to come to the rescue, 
will be tragically mistaken.”  Michael Leavitt, Secretary, Health and Human Services, Address 
to the Pandemic Influenza Leadership Forum (June 13, 2007), available at 
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/speech/2007/sp20070613a.html. Department of Homeland Se-
curity Secretary Michael Chertoff told the annual National Hurricane Conference in Orlando, 
Florida, “I believe [people] have a civic responsibility to take some sensible steps to get ready 
for hurricane season. . . .  People should be able to sustain themselves for up to 72 hours after 
a disaster. . . . that means individuals−especially those in the Gulf states−need to have an 
emergency plan and an emergency kit with adequate supplies of food, water, and other essen-
tials like a flashlight, first-aid, and medicines.”  CHRISTOPHER COOPER & ROBERT BLOCK, 
DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE FAILURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 306 (2006). 
101. See, e.g., HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006) available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/stra-
tergyimplementationplan.html. 
102. MD. LAW SCHOOL CTR. FOR HOMELAND SEC. & HEALTH, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE 
ON VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (forthcoming 2009) (manu-
script on file with the authors). 
103. See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW 
ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST (2006); Michael Greenberger, The Alfonse and Gas-
ton of Governmental Response to National Public Health Emergencies: Lessons Learned From Hurri-
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ministration generally preferred to keep information secret 
and resisted questioning about federal policies.104  Agencies 
declined to take responsibility for their actions or the harms 
they may have caused and instead called for immunity from 
liability for those who act on behalf of both public and private 
entities.105  They interpreted executive power broadly and per-
sonal freedoms narrowly.106  As with the “War on Terror,” 
there is no evidence that the country is demonstrably safer 
from disease.107 
The case of Andrew Speaker illustrates the unfortunate con-
sequences of blaming people for illness.  Speaker, a lawyer 
who had traveled in Asia, was diagnosed with multi-drug re-
sistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) in May 2007.108  He planned to 
begin more extensive treatment after his June wedding in 
Greece.  Although county health officials told him that travel-
ing was not advisable, he had already had four months of 
treatment for TB and appeared not to be contagious, and they 
 
cane Katrina for the Federal Government and the States, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2006). 
104. See Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 
1124-25 (2002) (discussing reduced access to public records and closed hearings after Septem-
ber 11); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 
951 (2006); Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The 
Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2002). 
105. George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1337, 1341 (2002) (discussing the immunity provision in the proposed Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act).  See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 103. 
106. See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Dratel eds., 2005). 
107. See JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY 
INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM (2006) (estimating federal 
government expenditures on homeland security to range from $64 million to $600 million for 
every life saved); MARC SIEGEL, FALSE ALARM: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF FEAR 
(2005); Ann Mongoven, The War on Disease and the War on Terror: A Dangerous Metaphorical 
Nexus?  15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 403, 407-08 (2006).  See also Kenneth Anderson, 
The Assumptions Behind the Assumptions in the War on Terror: Risk Assessment as an Example of 
Foundational Disagreement in Counterterrorism Policy, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 505, 513-15 (2008) (not-
ing that interpretation of risks may be colored by unexpressed assumptions based on ideol-
ogy). 
108. MDR-TB is a form of tuberculosis that is resistant to two or more drugs to treat TB.  It 
is very rare in the United States, where TB ordinarily can be cured by one or two drugs.  Gen-
erally, patients are not contagious after about two months, but continue taking the drugs to 
eliminate the bacillus and to avoid developing drug resistance and more severe future illness.  
Am. Thoracic Soc’y, CDC, and Infectious Diseases Soc’y of America, Treatment of Tuberculosis, 
52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2003).  Treatment for MDR-TB requires taking a 
combination of drugs for a period of up to two years, although the time to cure remains un-
certain. Joia S. Mukherjee et al., Programmes and Principles in Treatment of Multidrug-Resistant 
Tuberculosis, 363 LANCET 474, 477 (2004). 
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did not order him to stay home or isolate himself from others.  
If that were the end of the story, no one would have heard of 
Andrew Speaker.  After he left the country, however, a Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratory con-
cluded (incorrectly, as it turned out) that Speaker had a more 
severe form of tuberculosis, extensively resistant TB (XDR-TB), 
which is resistant to most TB drugs.  Suddenly, the official 
posture changed.  The CDC issued a federal order of isolation 
for the first time in four decades.109  CDC officials contacted 
Speaker in Italy and told him to stay there or hire a private 
plane to fly home (at an estimated cost of $140,000).  Faced 
with difficult choices and fearing he would be abandoned to 
die without treatment, Speaker stopped listening to the CDC 
and found another way to get back the United States.  He and 
his wife flew to Canada on a commercial airline flight and 
drove across the border into New York, where they reported 
to the health department, and Speaker was placed under a 
federal quarantine order. Soon thereafter, Speaker began spe-
cialized treatment in Denver as originally planned.110  Ironi-
cally, the Denver experts found that he did not have XDR-TB 
after all, and Speaker was responding well to treatment in 
2008. 
Speaker’s flight to Canada provoked memorable contro-
versy.  The CDC asked the Department of Homeland Security 
to put Speaker on the “no-fly” list, which was created to keep 
terrorists out of the United States.111  Although Speaker’s ac-
tions may not have been ideal, they were a predictable, human 
response to being treated like an enemy.  Many news reports 
and some journal articles demonized Speaker, and some law-
makers called for tougher laws.  All missed the real problem.  
Georgia law already authorized involuntarily confinement for 
 
109. Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Power and Legal Rights--Isolation and Quarantine in the Case of 
Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 433, 433 (2007).  The last order was re-
viewed in United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789, 790-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (up-
holding isolation order for woman who visited Stockholm when cases of smallpox were in 
Sweden). 
110. Colleen Slevin, TB Patient Released From Hospital, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/26/AR2007072601048. 
html?hpid=moreheadlines. 
111. See generally Parmet, supra note 109. The CDC has since updated its restrictions on air 
travel.  C.D.C., Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes--United States, June 2007-
May 2008, 57 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1009 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm. 
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anyone who had active, contagious TB and would behave so 
as to infect other people.112  Local health officials did not in-
voke that law to keep Speaker in the United States, either be-
cause he was not contagious or not likely to spread infection 
or both.  Indeed, to date, no one is known to have been in-
fected by Speaker.  If there were any legal obstacle, it may 
have been the bureaucratic requirements for (or expense of) 
providing private transport for Speaker to return home. 
More important, the public debate ignored the futility of 
stopping a disease as prevalent as TB by grounding one per-
son.  More than fourteen million people around the world 
have TB.113  Despite visa restrictions, many board international 
flights, sometimes unaware of their condition. In these circum-
stances, it is remarkable that disease transmission in-flight is 
so very rare.114  Far more successful ways to protect public 
health would be to develop better and faster diagnostic tests, 
more effective and faster-acting drugs with fewer unpleasant 
side effects, and more efficient ventilation and filter systems in 
public transportation of all types. 
These examples suggest that the post-9/11 focus on national 
security and personal responsibility distorted public health 
policy.  These twin approaches encouraged laws to expand the 
grounds for conducting surveillance,115 controlling individual 
behavior, and confining people who were sick.116  History 
 
112. GA. CODE ANN. §31-14-2 (2006) (Petition for commitment authorized where the “per-
son has active tuberculosis and is violating the rules and regulations promulgated by the de-
partment . . . and thereby presents a substantial risk of exposing other persons to an imminent 
danger of infection . . . .”). 
113. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT 2008: GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL: 
SURVEILLANCE, PLANNING, FINANCING 3 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/en-
tity/tb/publications/global_report/2008/pdf/fullreport.pdf. 
114. See Thomas A. Kenyon et al., Transmission of Multidrug-resistant Mycobacterium Tuber-
culosis During a Long Airplane Flight, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 933, 937 (1996) (noting that there is 
a relatively low risk of transmission of TB on U.S. commercial flights); see also Sonja J. Olsen et 
al., Transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Aircraft, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2416, 
2421 (2003) (noting that there is likely a low overall risk of transmission of SARS on flights); 
Annelies Wilder-Smith et al., Low Risk of Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on 
Airplanes: The Singapore Experience, 8 TROP. MED. INT’L HEALTH 1035, 1036 (2003).  See generally 
Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases During Commercial 
Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989 (2005). 
115. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, 
in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128 (Richard C. 
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). 
116. Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives: The Perils of Individualizing Public Health 
Problems, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 83, 95-98 (2009); see Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre-
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shows, however, that the more difficult and time-consuming 
tasks of building service programs have offered the best pro-
tection.  As the New York Academy of Medicine concluded in 
a 2007 study, “Currently, planners are developing emergency 
instructions for people to follow without finding out whether it 
is actually possible for them to do so or whether the instruc-
tions are even the most protective action for certain groups of 
people to take.”117 
These mistakes were compounded by the paucity of federal 
assistance for access to the medical care needed to prevent or 
cure illness.  Instead, funding once used to support essential 
public health services was shifted to new bioterrorism pro-
grams.118  Despite periodic calls for improving the public 
health patchwork infrastructure, public health has always re-
ceived a negligible share of national health spending.119  Given 
the current recession and the pressures on state budgets, pub-
lic health funding is likely to decline significantly.120  Yet even 
meagerly funded programs enabled people to forge connec-
tions with important health resources and prevent debilitating 
illness.121  Supplanting such programs with narrowly defined 
projects on “emergency preparedness” has left the country less 
prepared for both ordinary and emergency public health prob-
lems, including the possibility of a pandemic. 
One explanation for the failure to take a public health ap-
proach to “preparedness” may be the pressure to “do some-
thing.”  Since 9/11, federal agencies and state legislatures have 
been called upon to demonstrate their commitment to prevent-
 
paredness and Response Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 71.1-71.56 
(2008); 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-70.9 (2008). 
117. ROZ D. LASKER ET AL., WITH THE PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE, WE CAN MAKE SHELTERING IN 
PLACE POSSIBLE 26 (2007), available at http://www.nyam.org/library/docs/sipreport.pdf. 
118. See generally ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 14 (arguing that so much public health 
funding was earmarked for bioterrorism and emergency preparedness that basic public health 
programs were starved for resources); Elin Gursky, Progress and Peril: Bioterrorism Prepar-
edness Dollars and Public Health 50 (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (same), available at 
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/HomelandSecurity/Gursky_Progress_Peril.pdf. 
119. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 21 (2003).  See 
generally LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
(2000); INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1988). 
120. NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, AT LEAST 34 STATES 
HAVE IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS, BUT THE FEDERAL ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY PACKAGE IS REDUCING THE HARM 3 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-13-
08sfp.pdf. 
121. See generally Turnock, supra note 18. 
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ing future attacks.  In the health field, this translated into de-
veloping programs to prepare for bioterrorism and pandem-
ics.  But, as described above, developing a healthy, resilient 
community takes time and money.  It is easier and quicker to 
draft laws mandating confinement or treatment than to pro-
vide resources.  Legislators can express genuine support for 
protecting the community without spending scarce resources.  
Moreover, their legal advisors also are probably more familiar 
with drafting simple mandates than the technical expertise 
needed to create a complex system of resources for health care, 
prevention, and response to emergencies.  Many health law-
yers may have the expertise to examine laws governing civil 
commitment, malpractice liability, and professional licensure, 
but little familiarity with the administrative law or conflict of 
laws issues which govern allocating and coordinating respon-
sibility for programs and resources to respond to emergencies, 
not to mention the practical, logistical details that make re-
sponding possible.  However understandable these penchants 
may have been, they have not produced proposals that are 
relevant to the country’s needs.122  They have missed the op-
portunity to address the real problems of preparing for bioter-
rorist attacks, pandemics, or ordinary disease outbreaks. 
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR JUST AND EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS 
In January 2009, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, now the director 
of national intelligence, pledged to operate counterterrorism 
programs “in a manner consistent with our nation’s values, 
consistent with our Constitution and consistent with the rule 
of law.”123  This levelheaded and very American sensibility 
should guide the nation’s approach to the law affecting public 
health and pandemic preparedness.  Because the goal of emer-
gency response is to protect Americans, the public should be 
treated with respect rather than as potential enemies of the 
state.  Although emergencies sometimes require prompt ac-
tions in conditions of uncertainty, emergencies should not be-
come a pretext for the abuse of power. 
 
122. See generally Parmet, supra note 58. 
123. Scott Shane, Blair Pledges New Approach to Counterterrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23blaircnd.html?hp=&pagewanted. 
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As the federal Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism concluded, the 
most important way to protect the nation against terrorist bio-
logical attacks is to strengthen our foreign policy initiatives 
with countries like Russia, Pakistan, and Iran that have the po-
tential to develop biological weapons, prevent terrorists from 
entering the United States, and ensure the security of laborato-
ries and research with biologics.124  Most domestic bioterror-
ism and pandemic preparedness programs, in contrast, are de-
signed for damage control.  They operate to minimize harm af-
ter disease has been introduced into the country. 
The potential harm from the spread of an infectious or con-
tagious disease is the same, regardless of its initial source—
whether a laboratory accident, a deliberate criminal or terrorist 
act, the natural cycle of organisms, or global travel patterns.  
Initially, there may be no way to know which of these is re-
sponsible.  But, the response by health professionals has not 
depended (and cannot depend) on how a disease emerged.125  
For this reason, it is especially important to ensure that the 
laws governing disease control are not distorted by fears of 
terrorism.  The power granted or assumed by government to 
halt bioterrorism or a dangerous pandemic can and probably 
will be used to control all epidemics, including perhaps the 
annual appearance of influenza, for fear it could be the har-
binger of another 1918 pandemic.  Therefore, arguments that 
the risk of bioterrorism justifies extraordinary measures are 
arguments to permanently suspend constitutional protec-
tions.126 
Laws applicable to epidemics are ordinary laws governing 
disease control.  It is important to get the law right, because 
policies governing civil rights become entrenched over time 
and shape judicial interpretation of the government’s powers 
 
124. See generally COMM’N ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
PROLIFERATION & TERRORISM, WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM (2008), available at http://docu-
ments.scribd.com/docs/15bq1nrl9aerfu0yu9qd.pdf . 
125. The response does depend on the biology and pathology of the disease agent.  And, of 
course, if the source is criminal, law enforcement can pursue and prosecute the perpetrators, 
but that does not affect the treatment of people who may be exposed to disease. 
126. See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 52.  For arguments that bioterrorism and pan-
demic preparedness should include suspensions or dilutions of civil rights, see Lawrence O. 
Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of 
Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 27-29 (2003). 
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and individuals’ rights.127  Responsible planning should ensure 
that the law is not thoughtlessly distorted to set aside constitu-
tional protections for liberty and privacy.128  Instead, the law 
should ensure that people are protected not only from avoid-
able disease but also from unwarranted governmental intru-
sions.  In most cases, this does not require amending existing 
laws, even those adopted long ago, because all must be inter-
preted and applied in light of current constitutional doctrine. 
The following highlights several legal principles (summa-
rized in Table 1) that should inform any consideration of law 
directed at imposing individual responsibility—instead of so-
cial responsibility—for responding to pandemics. 
Quarantine and Isolation.  Quarantine is the measure most 
often associated with epidemics.  The term is often used to 
mean very different things.  Among public health practitio-
ners, quarantine usually denotes protecting a geographic loca-
tion, like a neighborhood, to prevent the spread of disease.129  
It has also been used to mean sealing off a home or a ship that 
houses infected residents, passengers, or cargo to prevent 
them from entering the general population.  In addition, the 
term quarantine is often used colloquially to mean the segre-
gation of individuals.  A more precise usage would be isola-
tion, which can be voluntary or compulsory.  Patients with 
contagious diseases routinely agree to be treated in voluntary 
isolation in hospitals or at home as part of ordinary medical 
care.  Involuntary detention or commitment requires a court 
order and is rarely used. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “[f]reedom 
from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern-
mental action.”130  State courts have used the Supreme Court’s 
 
127. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006). 
128. See Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on 
Lawrence O. Gostin’s Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221 (2003). 
129. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965) (stating that right to travel “does not 
mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be 
demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with 
the safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole.”). 
130. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
316 (1982)); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection.”) (citations omitted). 
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two-part test for civil commitment for mental illness131 as a 
model for the constitutional requirements for civil commit-
ment for contagious disease.132  In this context, the model re-
quires clear and convincing evidence that an individual is: (1) 
infected with a dangerous, contagious disease (not the com-
mon cold), and (2) likely to expose others to infection (either 
deliberately or because of an inability to control behavior or 
avoid contact with others).133  There are few reported cases ap-
plying this test, none at the Supreme Court level. Recent deci-
sions cluster around the rise of TB in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.134 
The federal government has the power to close its borders to 
persons and cargo that carry dangerous diseases.135  However, 
even the most careful border controls cannot guarantee that a 
virus will not slip in undetected.  Thus, the federal govern-
ment also has the authority to detain persons at the border to 
prevent certain diseases, specified by Executive Order, from 
entering the country.136  States may also request federal assis-
tance to suppress communicable diseases and enforce state 
quarantines for up to six months.137  The Stafford Act permits 
the President to implement health and safety measures when 
 
131. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76 (The Due Process Clause requires that the State “prove by 
clear and convincing evidence the two statutory preconditions to commitment:  that the per-
son sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own 
welfare and protection of others); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“We 
have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness 
with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’  
These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who 
suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.”) (inter-
nal citations omitted); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (“[A] State cannot con-
stitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving 
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or 
friends.”). 
132. City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (upholding 
civil commitment of man with active TB because he was homeless and unable to avoid contact 
with others); Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 662-63 (W. Va. 1980) (due process requires 
that counsel be provided before commitment hearing). 
133. See J.S., 652 A.2d at 270-71; Greene, 263 S.E.2d at 662. 
134. Parmet, supra note 92, at 98. 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006). 
136. Id. § 264(b)-(d) (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,375; 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (April 15, 2005) 
(Amending the list of diseases in Executive Order 13,295 of April 3, 2003, and adding 
“[i]nfluenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that have the potential to cause 
a pandemic.”).  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 247d-1 to 7f (2006). 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2006). 
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necessary to respond to a disaster.138  The John Warner Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act allows the President to em-
ploy the armed forces to “restore public order and enforce the 
laws of the United States” during a “serious public health 
emergency.”139  Thus, despite ambiguity in some statutory 
language, the federal government has ample power to take 
forceful action, both at the border and within the states, to halt 
disease. 
Nonetheless, a few proposals for new emergency laws have 
urged even stronger measures.  Among the more controversial 
are proposals to empower both state and federal agencies to 
involuntarily confine individuals who are merely suspected of 
harboring an infectious disease, without the evidence previ-
ously required that the person either has a disease or is a 
threat to public health, and precluding the person from peti-
tioning for a writ of habeas corpus.140  The idea is that if a new 
and dangerous disease appeared, it might not be possible to 
determine whether anyone is actually infected before deciding 
whether the person should be confined.  It is true that diseases 
like avian flu can induce respiratory symptoms, such as sneez-
ing, coughing, and fever, that are similar to ordinary, self-
limiting illnesses, like the common cold.141  However, more 
than mere belief on the part of an untrained official is required 
before subjecting anyone to detention.  The absence of eviden-
tiary standards invites abuse.  That approach carries a whiff of 
the arbitrariness seen in the detention of enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo.  Although courts generally defer to medical 
judgments about disease, the few reported decisions authoriz-
ing involuntary confinement in the modern era have been 
 
138. Id.  § 5121. 
139. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1076, 120 
Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006).  See Greenberger, supra note 43, at 107-08 (explaining how the law gives 
the federal government more discretion to assist states in an emergency situation). 
140. See generally Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed Nov. 
30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 70 & 71), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nci-
dod/dq/nprm/; Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:  
Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 622 (2002) (proposing new state laws).  In addition to eliminating a substantive 
standard for civil commitment, these proposals would reduce or omit essential procedural 
due process protections. 
141. Writing Comm. of the Second World Health Org., Update on Avian Influenza A (H5N1) 
Virus Infection in Humans, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 261, 266 (2008), available at 
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/358/3/261.pdf. 
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based on evidence of infection.142 
Moreover, no one presents any threat unless he or she is un-
able or unwilling to take precautions to avoid infecting other 
people, like voluntarily staying at home or wearing a face 
mask in public places.143  To eliminate half of the test would be 
tantamount to inviting preventive detention of everyone 
merely suspected of illness, a concept rightfully abhorred in a 
constitutional democracy.144 
We should keep in mind the SARS experience, in which a 
miniscule fraction of individuals found to have symptoms 
similar to SARS actually had the disease; most who did might 
have already been identified because they reported their own 
exposure to the illness or reported other more specific symp-
toms.145  Fears of the unknown may encourage the public to 
believe that extraordinary measures are needed to halt a pos-
sible epidemic.  Nevertheless, more severe consequences are 
the predictable result of overreaching. 146 
The case of Hongkham Souvannarath illustrates the risks of 
failing to provide public health services and the danger of 
substituting involuntary commitment for relevant treatment.147  
Ms. Souvannarath, who had voluntarily accepted TB treatment 
for several months, was jailed for failing to complete treat-
ment, largely because of a delay in her expected move to her 
son’s home and the health department’s lack of anyone who 
spoke Laotian, her native language.  After ten months in 
prison, she received an attorney and was released uncondi-
tionally.148  The health department had lobbied against the 
 
142. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111, 121, 131 (Wis. 2007) (Wis-
consin statute allows for involuntary confinement of a person with documentation of “infec-
tious tuberculosis,” “noninfectious tuberculosis but is at a high risk of developing infectious 
tuberculosis,” or “suspect tuberculosis” marked by symptoms and laboratory tests); City of 
Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 277-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Greene v. Edwards, 263 
S.E.2d 661, 662 (W. Va. 1980). 
143. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (rejecting the argument that men-
tal illness alone is sufficient justification for civil commitment). 
144. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (finding that dangerous alone is not 
sufficient for civil commitment, because persons subject to civil commitment must be distin-
guished “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclu-
sively through criminal proceedings”). 
145. See generally INST. FOR BIOETHICS, HEALTH POL’Y & LAW, supra note 77. 
146. See Parmet, supra note 109, at 433-43. 
147. See generally, PUB. HEALTH INST., SOUVANNARATH CASE STUDY (2003), available at 
www.phlaw.org/docs/souvannarath.pdf. 
148. Souvannarath v. Hadden, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
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state statute prohibiting confining TB patients in jail, arguing 
that it might not have funds to pay for hospital isolation 
wards.149  The California court rejected that argument on statu-
tory grounds, ordering the health department to cease housing 
TB patients in jail.150  Ultimately, Fresno County settled Ms. 
Souvannarath’s claims for violation of her civil rights for $1.2 
million.151  Indeed, patients should not be confined like con-
victed criminals.  The Supreme Court has emphasized the im-
portance of distinguishing between someone who is danger-
ous because he has committed a crime and someone who is 
dangerous because of mental illness and inability to control his 
conduct, even in the case of sex offenders, “lest ‘civil commit-
ment’ become a ‘mechanism for retribution or general deter-
rence’−functions properly those of criminal law, not civil 
commitment.”152  More important, however, was the health 
department’s failure to make it possible for Ms. Souvannarath 
to continue treatment by bringing her a new supply of drugs 
and ensuring accurate translation.153  Without resources, the 
department fell back on force and literally turned a simple de-
lay in treatment into a federal case of civil rights violations. 
Treatment.  The value of bodily integrity—not forcing 
treatment on people—has been so strong that even the rare 
person who has been involuntarily confined retains the right 
to bodily integrity and cannot be forced to take medication or 
undergo other treatment.154  In general, the goal of preventing 
 
149. See id. at 9, 16; INST. OF MED., ENDING NEGLECT: THE ELIMINATION OF TUBERCULOSIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 (Lawrence Geiter ed., 2000) (“[W]ithout question the major reason for 
the resurgence of tuberculosis was the deterioration of the public health infrastructure essen-
tial for the control of tuberculosis.”). 
150. Souvannarath, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13.  But see City of Milwaukee v. Washington, 735 
N.W.2d 111, 131 (Wis. 2007) (“[A] circuit court may take into account the cost of placement 
options when determining the place of confinement . . . but only after determining that two or 
more placement options fulfill the statutory requirements of proper medical treatment and 
disease prevention, and that none of these options is significantly less restrictive than the 
other(s).”). 
151. PUB. HEALTH INST., supra note 147, at 3. 
152. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
372-73 (1997) (Kennedy, J. concurring)). 
153. PUB. HEALTH INST., supra  note 147, at 2. 
154. See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 278-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).  
Courts have recognized an exception when necessary for maintaining security within the in-
stitution.  For example, state and federal prisons may require TB tests for inmates.  Sample v. 
Angelone, No. 98-7421, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1664, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) (per curiam); 
Fox v. Poole, 06CV148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33833, at *18 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) (Inmate 
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the spread of contagious disease can be served by segregating 
a person from others. 
In the United States, the right to make one’s own decisions 
about medical treatment has deep roots.155  The Massachusetts 
Bay Colony laws forbade physicians from treating patients 
without consent in 1649,156 and common law decisions have 
uniformly insisted that no competent adult can be treated 
without informed consent.157  Adults who are not legally com-
petent have the same substantive rights; a surrogate decision-
maker or health care proxy must act in accordance with the 
patients’ own wishes or, if their wishes are not known, in the 
patients’ best interest. The United States Supreme Court con-
firmed this well-settled law in Cruzan, which considered the 
right to make medical decisions for oneself to be a dimension 
of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution.158 
States, of course, have laws that require children to be im-
munized against certain contagious diseases.  These laws are 
justified despite the general right of self-determination largely 
as an exercise of the state’s parens patriae power to protect chil-
dren.159  They also serve a public health function to prevent the 
spread of disease.160  In 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a Massachusetts compulsory small pox 
vaccination statute with respect to healthy adults.161  That law 
did not authorize holding people down and injecting the vac-
cine into them, but instead penalized the unwilling by a $5 
 
who had tested positive for TB in past and refused to be tested upon entering prison was put 
in medical isolation); Neal v. Watts, No. 07-0915 (JR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20163, at *9-10 
(D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2008). 
155. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 113 (3d ed. 2004).  See generally RUTH R. 
FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
156. Surgeons, Midwives, Physicians, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1649 (1660 ed.). 
157. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779, 783-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that 
not revealing the possibility of paralysis after the surgery was a prima facie case of a violation 
of the physician’s duty to disclose the material risks of the surgery); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 
1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (analyzing the doctor’s duty to obtain informed consent, through both bat-
tery and negligence frameworks). 
158. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1990). 
159. See generally Walter J. Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions 
between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311 (1994). 
160. See generally Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Round: Restructuring Non-Medical 
Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277 
(2003). 
161. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905). 
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fine.162  Today, childhood immunization laws are enforced by 
keeping unvaccinated children out of school, not by having 
them forcibly vaccinated.  Furthermore, the public is more fa-
miliar with vaccines, as well as medicines, and their benefits.  
In an epidemic, the public is more likely to demand access to 
medications than to resist them, as happened after the anthrax 
attacks in 2001. 
Currently, the concept of epidemics has expanded among 
public health professionals to encompass non-contagious con-
ditions like obesity, diabetes, and cancer.163  Thus, if the gen-
eral goal of preventing the spread of disease—or more loosely, 
improving the public’s health—were sufficient to justify com-
pelling the general public to submit to specific treatment, there 
would be nothing left of the right to refuse treatment.164  At the 
same time, proposals for laws forcing individuals to submit to 
treatment ignore the need to provide care for all those who 
want and need it.165 
Privacy.  Since 9/11, surveillance to detect terrorist attacks 
and surveillance to detect contagious diseases have become 
virtually indistinguishable.166  A focus on emergencies encour-
ages officials to view the symptoms of many illnesses as the 
possible beginning of a pandemic.  Pressure to identify any 
case of infectious or contagious disease as soon as possible al-
ready has encouraged wide-ranging surveillance systems that 
continuously monitor individual medical records, pharmacy 
sales, and other sources and link them to databases in law en-
forcement, homeland security, agriculture, banking, customs, 
 
162. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903).  Five dollars in 1905 was the 
equivalent of about $116 in 2008. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, What is a Dollar 
Worth?, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/teacher/calc/ (last visited 
May 21, 2009). 
163. See, e.g., Thomas R. Frieden, Editorial, Asleep at the Switch: Local Public Health and 
Chronic Disease, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2059, 2060 (2004), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1448589&blobtype=pdf (arguing 
that public health should control chronic diseases with the same kind of measures applied to 
contagious diseases in the past). 
164. See Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal Boundaries, 10 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121, 132 (2007). 
165. See generally Wendy E. Parmet, Terri and Katrina: A Population-Based Perspective on the 
Constitutional Right to Reject Treatment, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 395 (2006). 
166. See generally Colleen A. Bradley, et al., BioSense:  Implementation of a National Early 
Event Detection and Situational Awareness System, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 11 
(2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su5401a4.htm. 
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and immigration.167  While it is important to detect a possible 
epidemic as early as possible, it is not necessary for govern-
ment to have daily access to everyone’s entire medical record 
with personally identifiable information.168 
State case law, legislation, and some state constitutions rec-
ognize general and specific individual rights of privacy in per-
sonal medical information and impose duties of confidential-
ity on physicians and other care providers that forbid disclos-
ing identifiable patient information without the patient’s 
consent.169  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act Privacy Rule permits, but does not require, “covered 
entities” to disclose identifiable patient information to health 
departments for certain public health purposes without the 
patient’s authorization.170  Covered entities like physicians and 
hospitals have no legal duty to report identifiable information 
in the absence of a valid law that itself requires reporting.  The 
duty to report, therefore, depends upon the constitutionality 
of the state reporting law. 
States must also meet federal constitutional standards for 
exercising the police power to override individual privacy in-
terests.  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Due 
Process Clause protects an “individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters,” without fully defining its 
scope.171  The Court has never reviewed a mandatory disease 
reporting law.172  Two of its decisions in abortion cases upheld 
laws requiring reporting abortion procedures without patient 
names for the purpose of monitoring physician compliance 
with abortion restrictions and to review medical outcomes 
where this could plausibly contribute to “the preservation of 
maternal health.”173 
 
167. See generally Mariner, supra note 56. 
168. See Robert A. Weinstein, Planning for Epidemics—The Lessons of SARS, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2332, 2334 (2004) (recent epidemics, including SARS, West Nile virus, and Anthrax, were 
detected by alert physicians, rather than formal surveillance systems). 
169. Mariner, supra note 56, at 372 n.115 (summarizing relevant law). 
170. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 
160, 164 (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2001). 
171. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (upholding a New York law requiring that a 
copy of Schedule II drug prescriptions be submitted by the prescribing physician to the state 
health department, because the state had a legitimate interest in deterring and investigating 
unlawful drug diversion). 
172. Mariner, supra note 56, at 376. 
173. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900 (1992) (upholding a Penn-
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These cases suggest that states can require mandatory re-
porting without names or other individually identifiable in-
formation for the purpose of monitoring the statistical occur-
rence of diseases.  The power to require reporting of identifi-
able information in the absence of a particular need to 
investigate individuals remains unsettled.  Although several 
public health agencies argue that states have the power to re-
quire any disease reporting without patient consent, recent 
cases suggest that mandatory reporting may be an invasion of 
constitutionally protected privacy unless the state can specifi-
cally justify its need for identifiable information.174  Height-
ened scrutiny is increasingly applied where individuals have 
reasonable expectations of privacy, as where the information is 
intimate or personal or its disclosure could chill the exercise of 
a constitutional right.175  The Supreme Court’s recognition of 
constitutional protection for patients’ medical care choices 
 
sylvania statute that required reporting abortion data without the patient’s name); Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80, 87 (1976) (upholding a Missouri law con-
taining reporting and recordkeeping requirements for statistical purposes because the re-
quirements were “reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and properly re-
spect[ed] a patient’s confidentiality and privacy”); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down earlier Pennsylvania abortion 
reporting law that required personal information without names and made reports available 
to the public). 
174. Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that pa-
tients’ informational rights were violated by requiring the disclosure of medical records that 
were not redacted); Doe v. City of N.Y., 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (employee had a consti-
tutional right to privacy in his HIV status, “because his personal medical condition is a matter 
that he is normally entitled to keep private”); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 190, 
193-95 (4th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the city had a compelling interest in deterring corruption 
that outweighed employee’s right to privacy and justified its requirement that the administra-
tor of the city’s alternative criminal sentencing program disclose her debts and arrests of fam-
ily members as part of police department background check, but not details of marriages, di-
vorces or births beyond data in the public record); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 
469-70 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1983) (city violated the right to privacy of ap-
plicant for police force by questioning her about off-duty sexual relations and miscarriages 
unrelated to job performance); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Ala. 1975) (a private matter 
does not adversely affect anyone beyond the actor and hence is none of [government’s] busi-
ness). 
175. See, e.g., Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that a 
jury could conclude that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that his deceased wife’s di-
ary would be kept confidential while in police possession and noting, “If an individual has a 
legitimate expectation of confidentiality, then ‘[d]isclosure of such information must advance 
a compelling state interest’”); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 
105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Most circuits appear to apply an ‘intermediate standard of review’ for 
the majority of confidentiality violations, with a compelling interest analysis reserved for ‘se-
vere intrusions" on confidentiality”) (citations omitted). 
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strengthens patients’ expectations of privacy.176 
None of the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to civil laws compelling 
medical information disclosure involve disease reporting 
laws.177  However, compulsory reporting of individually iden-
tifiable information should qualify as a search, because it in-
fringes on a patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy,178 or as 
a seizure, because it interferes with an individual’s possessory 
interests in information content, even in the civil context.179  
The cases also suggest that government must demonstrate a 
special need for identifiable medical information.  The con-
trary view—that consent to medical care creates a business re-
cord that can be submitted to a government agency without 
the patient’s consent—is implausible, because it would author-
ize government to seize medical records for any reason at all, 
including research. 
Some information systems, such as syndromic surveillance, 
can collect certain non-identifiable data, such as the number of 
patients with specific symptoms, for the purpose of detecting 
an outbreak without creating a data bank of unnecessary, per-
sonally identifiable information.180  Thus, it is possible to de-
 
176. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997) (holding that a patient is permitted to re-
fuse lifesaving treatment); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (upholding 
a Missouri law that requires evidence of an incompetent patient’s desire for medical treatment 
to be proved by clear and convincing evidence). 
177. The closest Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases relating to medical information 
arose in the context of suspicionless drug testing. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Indep. School 
Dist. No. 92 v Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding school policy requiring mandatory drug 
testing of student athletes); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding uncon-
stitutional the hospital’s use of drug screening tests as evidence of criminal conduct); Chan-
dler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (finding unconstitutional a Georgia law requiring candidates 
for office to certify that they had taken a drug test with a negative result); Vernonia School 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding no violation of students’ constitutional rights by 
school’s policy of random drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that regulations mandating drug tests of employees in-
volved in accidents and allowing testing of employees who violate certain rules did not vio-
late Fourth Amendment) 
178. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (patients have a reasonable expectation that the information 
they provide to their physicians “will not be shared with nonmedical personnel” without the 
patient’s consent). 
179. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992) (plaintiffs stated a sufficient cause of ac-
tion against Cook County deputy sheriffs under the Fourth Amendment, as the sheriffs act of 
towing the plaintiffs mobile homes was alleged to be a seizure); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that the seizure of a package containing drugs sent through Fed-
eral Express was reasonable despite the lack of warrant). 
180. See generally Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Implementing Syndromic Surveillance: A Practical 
MARINER-FORMATTED-HYPHEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2009  12:25:34 PM 
2009] PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS 377 
 
velop surveillance programs to monitor an emerging epidemic 
while protecting personal privacy.181 
Accountability.  Both official and private actors are usually 
accorded some leeway in responding to an emergency.182  The 
standard of conduct for negligence and the standard of care 
for professional liability are judged by reference to available 
resources.183  Thus, people who help others in an emergency 
outside the hospital, for example, are not held responsible for 
providing the kind of state of the art care that would be possi-
ble in a well-equipped clinical setting.  The Federal Volunteer 
Protection Act, for example, limits the liability of volunteers of 
nonprofit and governmental entities to “willful or criminal 
misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a con-
scious, flagrant indifference to the rights and safety of the in-
dividual harmed by the volunteer.”184  At the same time, the 
Act preserves liability on the part of the sponsoring organiza-
tion or entity, both for its own acts and omissions and those of 
its volunteers.185  State “Good Samaritan” laws contain similar 
limits on liability for aid voluntarily offered, generally outside 
the scope of one’s employment. 
Corporations have also sought protection from liability.  The 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act provides 
for total tort immunity for manufacturers of vaccines and 
drugs for conditions that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services has declared to constitute a “public health emer-
gency.”186  The Secretary has already declared avian influenza 
to constitute such an emergency justifying immunity for vac-
cine manufacturers.187 
 
Guide Informed by the Early Experience, 11 J. AM. MED. INFO. ASS’N. 141, 141 (2004); Arthur Rein-
gold, If Syndromic Surveillance Is the Answer, What Is the Question? 1 BIOSECURITY AND 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. AND SCI. 77 (2004). 
181. See generally Michael A. Stoto, Public Health Surveillance in the 21st Century:  Achieving 
Population Health Goals While Protecting Individuals’ Privacy and Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 703 
(2008). 
182. Existing laws providing limited, qualified and other forms of immunity for the acts 
and omissions of government officials are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
183. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 337-38, 
456 (6th ed. 2008). See generally William M. Sage, Principles, Pragmatism, and Medical Injury, 286 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 226 (2001). 
184. Federal Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (1997). 
185. Id. § 14503(c). 
186. 42 U.S.C.  § 247d-6d (2005). 
187. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Pandemic Influenza Vaccine—Amendment, 73 
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So far, there is no evidence that immunity from liability has 
any significant effect on the number of qualified health profes-
sionals who volunteer to help in disasters like Katrina or even 
in an isolated emergency in an airplane or by the side of the 
road.  Physicians sometimes assert that they would prefer not 
to volunteer unless they received immunity from liability.188  
Yet, such reports tell us little about what happens in practice.  
After all, given the chance, almost everyone, from securities 
brokers to peanut producers, would prefer not to be subject to 
liability at all.  There is no evidence that Good Samaritan laws 
increase the instances in which physicians volunteer to help 
out in an emergency.  Thus, most such laws can be seen as 
public symbols of the existing principle that people will not be 
held liable for failing to do the impossible in an emergency. 189 
Such symbolism can be counterproductive, however, espe-
cially where it extends immunity beyond mere negligence or 
to paid health professionals.  In pandemic planning, where the 
need for public trust is paramount, it is of special concern.  
Granting officials immunity from liability suggests that the 
public cannot trust officials to treat them with at least ordinary 
care within the limits of the resources available.  Moreover, of-
ficials are typically granted additional discretion during an 
emergency.  The prospect of accountability is often the only 
check on the temptation to cut corners and abuse their power.  
Indeed, the more discretion that officials are granted, the more 
important it is to hold them accountable for their acts and 
omissions.  Finally, there is the question of principle: Who 
should bear the cost of injury in a disaster setting—the injured 
party, the volunteer, the relief organization, an insurer, or the 
state?190  During an emergency of any kind, especially a pan-
 
FED. REG. 61871, 61,871-61,873 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
188. STANLEY M. LEMON ET AL., ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING 
PANDEMIC DISEASE, WORKSHOP SUMMARY 13, 65 (2007). 
189. See Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health 
Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1943 (2008) (supporting immunity for symbolic purposes, de-
spite lack of evidence that immunity increases volunteers). 
190. In practice, it can be difficult to draft legislation that limits liability without extending 
immunity to inappropriate situations, as illustrated by recent attempts to draft bills providing 
for an “altered standard of care” during disasters or epidemics.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Mercy 
Health Ctr., 864 P.2d 839, 845 (Okla. 1993) (holding that a hospital was immune under the 
Good Samaritan Act from liability for placing a man in a bed without monitoring or security 
after he became dizzy while observing the birth of his child, because the man himself was not 
a hospital patient); Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Emergency 
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demic, the government’s first priority should be to help 
Americans in need. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is truth in the axiom that prevention is better than 
cure.  An air transportation system that deflects birds away 
from air routes is better than one that relies on the skills of 
Captain Sullenberger, his crew, and passengers to survive a 
crash.  Of course, we cannot do without training and resources 
to respond to unavoidable emergencies, but prevention can 
greatly reduce the probability that an emergency will happen. 
The resources needed for both prevention and response 
have little to do with the kind of laws that are most commonly 
taught in law school, especially in public health law classes.191  
Public health responds to public needs, not individual liability.  
The law governing public health, however, has been distorted 
by a post-9/11 anti-terrorism policy with two features: (1) 
government control over national security threats; and (2) in-
dividual responsibility for risks to one’s own health.  This ap-
proach encouraged the mistaken assumption that the public is 
prone to panic and in need of government control.192  It fright-
ened the public without providing people with the means to 
protect themselves. 
Today, scare tactics have lost their force.  With renewed at-
tention to the possibility of health system reform, there is an 
opportunity for a fresh approach—one that can prevent or 
minimize harm, maximize health, and engage the population 
in positive ways.  Emergency preparedness and public health 
policy are an integral part of the country’s overall health pol-
icy.  The principles that guide health reform also inform emer-
gency preparedness, because a healthy population is better 
prepared to prevent or withstand a pandemic or other emer-
gency.  A public health approach to emergency preparedness 
recognizes the positive role for government in making medical 
 
Volunteer Health Practitioners Act, Dec. 6, 2006, available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Up-
loads/uevhpafinal.pdf. 
191. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between In-
dividual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 519 (2008). 
192. Wilson & Baker, supra note 4, at A25 (reporting that the Chief of Emergency Medical 
Services for the New York Fire Department was “stunned that some of those [Flight 1549] 
passengers did not appear to have been through an ordeal at all.”). 
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care and public health services accessible to everyone and 
enabling people do what is best for themselves.  There is no 
need for new laws blaming individuals for spreading disease 
or absolving officials from accountability.  Instead, we can re-
store public trust in America’s health system by developing 
programs that are “consistent with our nation’s values, consis-
tent with our Constitution and consistent with the rule of 
law.”193 
 
193. Shane, supra note 123. 
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PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PRINCIPLES 
FOR LAWS GOVERNING INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT 
Protecting Health 
Government should ensure universal access to a reliable source of 
medical care and support public health services to protect the popu-
lation’s health and develop the resilience needed to survive emer-
gencies. 
Government should ensure an adequate supply and fair and effi-
cient distribution of vaccines, medications, food, water, and other 
necessaries in the event of a pandemic. 
Access to care should not be conditioned on a waiver of one’s 
constitutional rights. 
Public health measures must not be based on race, color, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. 
Government plans for responding to a pandemic should be de-
veloped with community engagement, rather than individual re-
sponsibility, and should respond to community needs. 
Governments should ensure that all individuals who follow pub-
lic health advice and stay home during a pandemic receive food, 
medicine, and other necessaries and are not penalized or deprived 
of income, medication, or other necessaries by private parties, in-
cluding employers and insurers. 
Protecting Liberty 
Coercive measures, such as involuntary detention, should be im-
posed only as a last resort, only where government can demonstrate 
that there is a sound scientific and constitutional basis for doing so, 
and only when they are the least restrictive alternative to prevent 
the spread of an established pandemic. 
Individuals proposed for detention should be provided with 
counsel and an expeditious judicial hearing to ensure that their de-
tention is in fact legally justified.  The government should bear the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
poses a significant risk of danger to others and that that risk cannot 
be mitigated by less restrictive measures.  Individuals who are de-
tained must be housed in a medical facility and never in a correc-
tional facility. 
Travel bans should only be imposed where there is a reasonable 
scientific justification and only to the degree necessary to prevent 
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the spread of disease.  Individuals denied the right to travel should 
be provided procedural due process, including notice, the right to 
counsel, and the opportunity for a hearing before an independent 
decision maker. 
Invasive medical examinations, even at the border, should only be 
conducted where there is sufficient reason to suspect pandemic dis-
ease and only with the individual’s informed consent. 
Protecting Privacy 
Disease surveillance generally should be conducted using meth-
ods, including syndromic surveillance, that do not collect individual 
names or other identifiable information without the individual’s 
consent.  Compulsory reports of names and other individually iden-
tifiable information should be limited to cases in which a person 
with a dangerous disease poses a credible threat of infecting others 
and an authorized government agency expects to interview the per-
son in order to investigate the outbreak. 
Mandatory reporting laws should specify procedures for keeping 
individually identifiable information strictly confidential and secure 
and penalties for failure to maintain confidentiality. 
Government agencies that legitimately receive identifiable infor-
mation should not use that information for any purpose other than 
investigating disease outbreaks without the individual’s prior au-
thorization. 
Data collected for purposes of investigating or monitoring the in-
cidence or prevalence of diseases should not be linked with other 
data that would permit identifying an individual. 
Protecting Democracy 
All public and private entities should remain accountable for their 
actions in accordance with the law and should not be relieved of li-
ability for personal injury or civil rights violations. 
Every effort should be made to preserve the operation of the judi-
cial system and to protect the lives and health of judges and court 
personnel needed to preserve the rule of law. 
Government should provide clear, accurate, and timely informa-
tion to the public and honestly report uncertainties in the informa-
tion available. 
 
